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I. INTRODUCTION 
Courts interpreting the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 
(ICWA) must wade through a muddy mixture of policies and 
precedent to reach decisions, but that is common to federal Indian 
law. What makes their task even more “gut-wrenching”1 are the 
people at stake, children and parents involved in contested 
adoptions that “cut at the heart of the most sacred, essential 
institutions of our society—the family.”2 Nevertheless, courts 
regularly upheave families in messy adoptions. ICWA cases are 
 
 1. In re Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 1, 417 P.3d 1, 4. 
 2. Id. ¶ 91, 417 P.3d at 32 (Lee, J., dissenting). 
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truly unique because of the added weight of preventing the 
disruption of a child’s connection to another institution—her tribe. 
This relationship, which has “no parallel in other ethnic cultures 
found in the United States[,]” is equally sacred.3 It is also far rarer. 
Despite the guidance of ICWA (a statute that in part requires states 
to account for tribal rights in child placements) courts struggle to 
understand, respect, and accommodate child-tribal relationships. 
Artists and poets are better suited to explore the boundaries and 
meaning of human relationships, but legislatures and courts must 
necessarily delineate them. ICWA defines parent as “any biological 
parent or parents of an Indian child or any Indian person who has 
lawfully adopted an Indian child, including adoptions under tribal 
law or custom. It does not include the unwed father where pater-
nity has not been acknowledged or established.”4 Congressional 
silence has left courts the responsibility of determining what quali-
fies as acknowledging or establishing paternity for unwed fathers. In 
response, state courts have not adopted one standard but three. 
Most expect unwed fathers to fulfill the state laws regarding 
acknowledging or establishing paternity to qualify as a parent under 
ICWA. Others use state law as a guideline by which to judge a 
father’s efforts but adopt a standard that allows fathers to imper-
fectly comply. 
The third standard for establishing paternity, a federal reason-
ableness standard, was recently announced by the Utah Supreme 
Court on August 31, 2017. In re Adoption of B.B. concerned the 
contested adoption of the child (B.B.) of two unmarried, enrolled 
members of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.5 Prior to the child’s 
birth, Birth Father supported Birth Mother on the reservation in 
South Dakota, but once she moved to Utah in the summer of 2014 
she ceased contact with him.6 Upon B.B.’s birth in August, Birth 
Mother relinquished her parental rights and gave consent to 
adoption.7 Additionally, on official documents she misrepresented 
that her brother-in-law was the biological father and that he was 
 
 3. In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969 (Utah 1986). 
 4. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2012). 
 5. Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 4, 417 P.3d at 5. 
 6. Id. ¶ 5, 417 P.3d at 5. 
 7. Id. ¶ 6, 417 P.3d at 5. 
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not a member of a tribe.8 The brother-in-law relinquished his 
purported parental rights and consented to the adoption without 
Birth Father’s awareness the child was even born.9 
Birth Mother proceeded with the adoption, but once she 
returned to South Dakota she informed Birth Father of her misrep-
resentation.10 After contacting the tribe, adoption agency, and state, 
Birth Father motioned to intervene to establish paternity on 
December 31, 2014.11 After a series of motions from the tribe, birth 
parents, and adoptive parents, the district court denied Birth 
Father’s motion to intervene because it found he was not a parent 
under ICWA for failing to file his court affidavit, file notice of 
paternity proceedings, and offer to pay for Birth Mother’s preg-
nancy expenses before Birth Mother executed her consent for 
adoption.12 His untimeliness under state law disqualified him from 
receiving the additional parental protections of ICWA.13 Birth 
Father then appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court found that Birth Father did 
acknowledge paternity under ICWA and therefore was a parent.14 
However, the majority used a different standard than the district 
court.15 Rather than requiring Birth Father to fulfill state law, the 
Utah Supreme Court held his actions needed to pass a federal 
reasonableness standard.16 Under this new standard, Birth Father’s 
untimeliness was not dispositive when compared with the 
evidence of his completion of all tasks required by state law for 
paternity actions, his residence with Birth Mother during the 
majority of her pregnancy, his “significant steps to care for his 
unborn child, including financial support during Birth Mother’s 
pregnancy,”17 his intentions to live with Birth Mother in Utah, and 
his active involvement in the adoption proceedings.18 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. ¶ 8, 417 P.3d at 6. 
 11. Id. ¶ 9, 417 P.3d at 6. 
 12. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-121(3) (West 2017). 
 13. Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 12, 417 P.3d at 7. 
 14. Id. ¶ 49, 417 P.3d at 18. 
 15. Id. ¶ 51, 417 P.3d at 19. 
 16. Id. ¶ 71, 417 P.3d at 24–25. 
 17. Id. ¶ 82, 417 P.3d at 29. 
 18. Id. ¶ 74, 417 P.3d at 27. 
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In contrast, the dissent would have continued to use the state 
law standard because the dissenting justices construed acknowledge 
and establish as legal terms of art that signal the use of the state law 
standard.19 Under this reading, Birth Father’s incompliance with 
state law for acknowledging paternity disqualified him as a parent 
under ICWA.20 
In re Adoption of B.B. raises critical questions about Congress’s 
use of the words acknowledge and establish. Do the terms signify the 
intent for courts to use existing state laws for determining paternity 
or do they create a separate federal standard? The answer has 
significant consequences for litigants: under a federal standard, this 
biological father was granted the opportunity to intervene, which 
potentially prevents the adoption of a child he wishes to keep. More 
broadly, the answer will demarcate the boundaries of federal, 
tribal, and state power.  
The couple whose opportunity to adopt B.B. was curtailed by 
In re Adoption of B.B. filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the 
United States Supreme Court on December 29, 2017, but the Court 
denied it on March 26, 2018.21 The highest court thus saved these 
lingering questions for another day. 
 In the meantime, I answer these questions. I argue that under 
current U.S. Supreme Court precedent, courts should be applying 
a state law standard for acknowledging and establishing paternity 
under ICWA. However, a state law standard does not sufficiently 
advance the purpose of the statute, and it improperly balances the 
rights of Indian children, parents, tribes, and the state. Thus, 
Congress should amend ICWA to permit unwed fathers to estab-
lish paternity by either (1) fulfilling new federal requirements 
enumerated in the amendment or (2) fulfilling the requirements of 
their tribal law or custom. 
In Part II, I provide the historical background of ICWA to 
demonstrate why state institutions are a threat to the welfare of 
Indian children and tribes. Part III contains the description of the 
three different standards and the rationales for applying each. In 
Part IV, I conclude that given the U.S. Supreme Court precedent of 
using state law for undefined family law terms, the doctrine of the 
 
 19. Id. ¶ 170, 417 P.3d at 49–50 (Lee, J., dissenting). 
 20. Id. ¶ 202, 417 P.3d at 57. 
 21. R.K.B. v. E.T., 417 P.3d 1 (Utah 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1326 (2018) (mem.). 
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separation of powers, and key distinctions from a Supreme Court 
case that would suggest a federal standard, courts must currently 
apply the state law standard for acknowledge and establish. Addi-
tionally, I present principles that Congress should include in an 
amendment that would better fulfill its purposes in enacting ICWA 
and respond to current amendment proposals. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 Following centuries of federal policy aimed at assimilating 
Native Americans into mainstream American society, Congress 
found “that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are 
broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children 
from them by nontribal public and private agencies and that an 
alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in non-
Indian foster and adoptive homes and institutions.”22 
 State courts were complicit, if not blatantly on the frontlines, in 
the cultural war against Indian tribes.23 In response, Congress set 
forth “minimum Federal standards”24 to protect Indian children, 
parents, and tribes from “deliberate, collaborative abuse of the 
child welfare system” such as when state institutions used “vague 
allegations of poverty and neglect” to excuse their removal of 
Indian children.25 ICWA’s procedural standards create space for 
tribes to exercise their authority to determine what is in the best 
interests of their members’ children and the survival of the tribe by 
giving tribal courts (1) exclusive jurisdiction when the child is 
domiciled on the reservation and (2) concurrent jurisdiction with 
the states when the child is domiciled off the reservation.26 Parties 
seeking “foster care placement of, or involuntary termination of 
parental rights to, an Indian child must establish by stringent 
 
 22. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (2012). 
 23. See id. § 1901(5) (“[T]he States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian 
child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have often failed to 
recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social standards 
prevailing in Indian communities and families.”). 
 24. Id. § 1902. 
 25. Brief of Amici Curiae National Congress of American Indians et al. at 1, Nat’l 
Council for Adoption v. Jewell, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727 (E.D. Va. 2015) (No. 1:15cv00675) (cita-
tions omitted). 
 26. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)–(b). 
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standards of proof that efforts have been made to prevent the 
breakup of the Indian family” thus protecting against the arbitrary 
use of state power.27 Substantively, ICWA also curtails the power 
of states by requiring courts to follow placement preferences in 
adoptive, foster care, and preadoptive placements. The child’s 
extended family and tribe are favored first, followed by another 
Indian tribe, and finally non-Indians.28 
The federal government has a long history of constraining state 
power over tribes.29 What is unusual about ICWA is the federal 
government’s reach into domestic relations, an area usually 
“belong[ing] to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the 
United States.”30 The principle permitting each exercise of federal 
power against the states or in favor of the tribe (or as is often the 
case, in favor of the states and against the tribes31) is the trust 
relationship between the federal government and tribes.32 Further-
more, Congress has plenary power over tribes that it uses to both 
protect and abrogate tribal sovereignty. In this instance, Congress 
“assumed the responsibility for the protection and preservation 
of . . . [tribal] resources[,]” of which children are particularly “vital 
to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes.”33 
Many of ICWA’s additional protections are available only if a 
party can meet the definition of parent in § 1903. The law provides 
for court-appointed counsel if there is a finding of indigence, a 
guarantee that the proceedings will be translated into a language 
that the parent understands, the option to withdraw consent for 
foster placements under state law, withdrawal of consent in 
voluntary proceedings for termination of parental rights, objections 
in transferring the case from state to tribal jurisdiction, the 
opportunity to collaterally attack the termination of rights upon 
 
 27. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 57 (1989) (citations omitted). 
 28. 25 U.S.C. § 1915. 
 29. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Williams v. 
Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (1 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 30. Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890). 
 31. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 
438 (1997); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
 32. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2). 
 33. Id. § 1901(2)–(3). 
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consent being obtained through duress or fraud, and the ability to 
petition if proceedings violate certain ICWA provisions.34 
Even more significantly, if a father cannot establish paternity, 
ICWA may not be applied to the proceedings at all if the disquali-
fied father’s tribal membership is the only evidence that the child is 
an Indian child.35 All the protections against the abuse of state law 
that ICWA was meant to provide would be unavailable to the child, 
the father, and the tribe. Litigants have compelling incentives to 
argue that a father did or did not establish paternity. The recent 
litigation crescendo over the standard used to acknowledge or estab-
lish paternity shows parties’ increased recognition of the stan-
dard’s importance and adds urgency to finding the right answer.36 
 The federal courts’ and agencies’ interpretations of ICWA are 
central to its history. The U.S. Supreme Court provided founda-
tional principles for analyzing ICWA’s definitions in Mississippi 
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield. Twenty-four years later, Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor dissented in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl and 
opined on the requirements for acknowledging and establishing 
paternity. The federal executive branch addressed the definition in 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs 2016 ICWA Guidelines. Discussion of 
authority follows. 
 
 34. Id. §§ 1911–1914. 
 35. Brief for the Inter Tribal Council of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents Birth Father and Cherokee Nation at 20–21, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 
U.S. 637 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1308813 (“[If] an unwed father who has not technically 
preserved his parental rights pursuant to state law would not qualify as a ‘parent’ under 
ICWA, an otherwise involuntary proceeding under 25 U.S.C. § 1912 would be transformed 
into a voluntary proceeding under 25 U.S.C. § 1913 merely by virtue of the mother’s 
voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights to the Indian child. In such circumstances, 
ICWA’s requirements for involuntary proceedings, including notice to the child’s tribe, 
would arguably not apply. This result—the termination of parental rights to an Indian child 
without notice to the child’s tribe, and over the objection of the child’s biological Indian 
parent—is clearly not what Congress intended in crafting ICWA’s provisions.” (cita-
tion omitted)). 
 36. Of the nine cases related to the definition of acknowledging and establishing 
paternity in appellate courts, four have been in the past ten years. See Adoptive Couple v. 
Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013); In re Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, 417 P.3d 1; Bruce L. v. W.E., 
247 P.3d 966 (Alaska 2011); Jared P. v. Glade T., 209 P.3d 157 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). 
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A. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield was the first U.S. 
Supreme Court case to address ICWA, twelve years after it was 
passed.37 Its principles provide the foundation for the analysis in 
future ICWA cases. The legal question was if the Court should 
apply a state or federal definition of domicile to determine whether 
the state of Mississippi could exercise jurisdiction over the 
proposed adoption.38 
The controversy arose because two enrolled members of the 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians traveled 200 miles away from 
their homes on the reservation for the birth of their twins.39 The 
adoption of the twins was processed in the local chancery court and 
the children were given to a non-Indian couple.40 The tribe under 
ICWA, however, has exclusive custody proceedings over children 
“who resid[e] or [are] domiciled within the reservation.”41 The tribe 
motioned to vacate the adoption decree but was overruled.42 
Eventually the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the chancery 
court’s findings that the twins were not “domiciled” on the 
reservation according to Mississippi state law because (1) they had 
never been physically present there, and (2) they were “‘voluntarily 
surrendered’ by their parents, who went to some efforts to see that 
they were born outside the reservation and promptly arranged for 
their adoption.”43 The Mississippi Supreme Court went to great 
lengths to distinguish the case from state common law, which 
dictates that the domicile of children follows their parents.44 The 
result of the holding that the twins were not “domiciled” on the 
 
 37. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
 38. Id. at 40–41. 
 39. Id. at 38–39. 
 40. Id. at 37. 
 41. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2012). 
 42. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 38–39. 
 43. Id. at 38. 
 44. In re Guardianship of Watson, 317 So. 2d 30, 32 (Miss. 1975) (“The law is unchal-
lenged that the residence of a minor is that of his parents and remains so during the period 
of minority . . . .”); Stubbs v. Stubbs, 211 So. 2d 821, 824 (Miss. 1968) (“Quite clearly the 
domicile established by the mother and father of the decedent in Natchez, Mississippi, in 
1955 became the domicile of the minor child.”); Boyle v. Griffin, 36 So. 141, 142 (Miss. 1904) 
(“His domicile being in Memphis, that also was the domicile of his children in the view of 
the law.”). 
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reservation is that parents of Indian children could thwart ICWA’s 
guarantee that tribes can exercise jurisdiction over their most 
vital resource.45 
The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Mississippi Supreme 
Court’s decision concerning the source for the definition of domicile. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that a uniform federal definition 
applies because the use of individual state law “cannot be what 
Congress had in mind when it used the term [domicile].”46 Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court created a uniform federal definition, it still 
drew upon “well-settled” state law to formulate Congress’s intent 
for “a term it did not define.”47 It borrowed “established common-
law principles of domicile to the extent that they are not inconsis-
tent with the objectives of the congressional scheme.”48 
The holding of the case, a straightforward rule that Indian 
children take the domicile of their mother, is less significant than 
the framework the U.S. Supreme Court developed for examining 
the use of federal and state law within ICWA.49 First, courts look to 
Congress’s purpose in protecting “the rights of Indian families and 
Indian communities vis-à-vis state authorities.”50 Second, courts 
determine if Congress intended uniform federal law to apply to the 
question.51 Third, courts must balance the rights of the child, bio-
logical parents, adoptive parents, and tribe.52 Holyfield’s question of 
domicile pitted the rights of Indian families against the rights of 
tribes. In this instance, the rights of the Indian tribe superseded 
those of the family. 
The dissent by Justice Stevens, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and 
Justice Kennedy acknowledged the importance of looking to Con-
gress’s purposes and applying uniform federal law.53 However, the 
Justices formulated a different balance of tribal and familial rights. 
From the Justices’ view, the “best interests of the child” and the 
 
 45. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3). 
 46. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 47. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 47–48. 
 49. Id. at 53. 
 50. Id. at 45. 
 51. Id. 45–46. 
 52. Id. at 55–58 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 53. Id. 
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“stability and security of Indian tribes and families” are not 
represented when “the parents’ deliberate choice of jurisdiction” is 
defeated.54 The Justices reasoned that because Indian parents 
whose child is domiciled on the reservation can veto the transfer of 
an action from state court to tribal court, a similar mechanism 
should be available to parents of a child not domiciled on the 
reservation to select “the forum . . . that most reflects the parents’ 
familial standards.”55 
B. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 
After Holyfield, the Supreme Court did not hear another ICWA 
case until 2013. The convoluted facts of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 
raised many legal questions, including the possibility that the birth 
father was not a parent per § 1903(9).56 If he did not meet the 
definition of parent, Adoptive Couple argued ICWA would be 
irrelevant to the case; the Court could not apply protections of the 
high standard of harm and remedial efforts to his case.57 However, 
this critical question about the definition of parent went 
unanswered. Because the Court did not need to decide if he was a 
parent, it did not. For the sake of argument, it was assumed the 
father qualified.58 
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, and 
Scalia, issued a dissent that briefly addressed the question 
anyway.59 Justice Sotomayor cited Holyfield to explain, “Congress 
intended the critical terms of the statute to have uniform federal 
decisions.”60 Later she reasoned, “[I]t is incongruous to suppose 
that Congress intended a patchwork of federal and state law to 
apply in termination of parental rights proceedings.”61 Even 
though the position of the five majority justices regarding the parent 
question is unknown, the presence of Justice Scalia in this dissent 
 
 54. Id. at 60. 
 55. Id. at 61. 
 56. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013). 
 57. Id. at 639–43. 
 58. Id. at 646–47. 
 59. Id. at 670–73. 
 60. Id. at 671 (citing Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 44–
45 (1989)). 
 61. Id. at 681. 
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indicates that the federal standard could be upheld by conservative, 
textualist judges as well.62 
C. BIA Guidelines 
Though most of the substantive debate about acknowledging or 
establishing paternity has occurred in courts, the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (BIA) has addressed the question through the agency’s rules 
and Guidelines for Implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act.63 
The result is a slightly inaccurate restatement of state case law that 
does not refine the answer. 
The 1979 Guidelines did not provide any suggestions to state 
courts for interpreting the definition of parent.64 The 2015 Guide-
lines added the following to the definition, “To qualify as a parent, 
an unwed father need only take reasonable steps to establish or 
acknowledge paternity. Such steps may include acknowledging 
paternity in the action at issue or establishing paternity through 
DNA testing.”65 The invocation of reasonableness reflects the recent 
trend in case law toward less-rigid requirements. But significantly, 
these guidelines do not have the force of law nor do they provide 
the answer to the fundamental question: are these “reasonable 
steps” a matter of state or federal law? 
But one year later, the BIA backed away from adopting the 
reasonableness standard in rules, which, unlike the guidelines, 
bind agencies and courts. In anticipation of the 2016 rules, the 
agency presented the results of the notice and comment period: 	  
 
 62. Because Justice Sotomayor’s writing on this question is dicta, my analysis is specu-
lative. Justice Scalia may not have fully supported the argument about the question of estab-
lishing paternity and may have agreed to join the dissent based upon the first question. 
Nevertheless, his choice to write separately and to join Justice Sotomayor suggests he agreed 
with her key arguments, which may include her view of establishing paternity. 
 63. Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,778 (June 14, 2016) (to be 
codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23). 
 64. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Welfare Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584 
(Nov. 26, 1979). 
 65. Guidelines for State Courts and Agencies in Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 80 
Fed. Reg. 10,146, 10,151 (Feb. 25, 2015). 
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These commenters recommended language requiring an unwed 
father to ‘‘take reasonable steps to establish or acknowledge pater-
nity’’ and recommended listing examples of such steps to include 
acknowledging paternity in the action at issue and establishing 
paternity through DNA testing. Another commenter requested 
clarification on when the father must acknowledge or establish 
paternity, because timing impacts due process and permanency 
for the child.66 
However, despite the request for clarity by these commenters, 
the BIA declined to address the manner and timing of acknowl-
edging or establishing paternity: 
The final rule mirrors the statutory definition and does not 
provide a Federal standard for acknowledgment or establishment 
of paternity. The Supreme Court and subsequent case law has 
already articulated a constitutional standard regarding the rights 
of unwed fathers . . . . Many State courts have held that, for ICWA 
purposes, an unwed father must make reasonable efforts to 
establish paternity, but need not strictly comply with State laws. 
At this time, the Department does not see a need to establish an 
ICWA-specific Federal definition for this term.67 
Two contextual elements suggest why the BIA did not elucidate 
the definition after recognizing a split in state courts.  First, the 
relatively few state cases about establishing paternity do not 
provide a consensus,68 so the BIA may delay until one develops. 
Second, the agency was aware of Justice Sotomayor’s 2013 dissent 
in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl when it issued the guidelines. The 
U.S. Supreme Court narrowly avoided the question of establishing 
paternity in Adoptive Couple, but by addressing it in her dissent, 
Justice Sotomayor effectively invited new litigation so that the 
question can be resolved. Rather than promulgating something that 
may soon be overturned by the Supreme Court, the BIA may leave 
the debate to state courts. 
 
 66. Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,778, 38,795–96 (June 14, 
2016) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23). 
 67. Id. at 38,796 (citations omitted). 
 68. See e.g., Jared P. v. Glade T., 209 P.3d 157 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (applying state law 
but requiring imperfect compliance); In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 
925, 935 (N.J. 1988) (applying state law exactly). 
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Of these historical authorities, Holyfield is the most important 
source of law in answering the question of what it means to estab-
lish paternity under ICWA. Not only is it the solitary mandatory 
federal authority but it also provides the key rationales for using 
federal law in an ICWA context and supplies the most detail about 
the interplay of statutory purpose with ICWA’s provisions.  
III. THREE STANDARDS FOR ESTABLISHING PATERNITY 
State courts have three responses to the question of what 
Congress intended by using, but not defining, establish and acknowl-
edge. The first is that courts interpret establish and acknowledge as 
terms of art that signal the application of state law. Courts reason 
that because there is no federal paternity law and because ICWA is 
implemented in state institutions, fathers must establish paternity 
by meeting the state standard. The second response is that ICWA 
must invoke a federal standard because its primary purpose was to 
protect Indian families against the unjust application of state law. 
Because there is no specific federal paternity law, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the federal law is a reasonableness standard. The 
displacing of state law with federal law has precedent in the U.S. 
Supreme Court case Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield.69  
The In re Adoption of B.B. court addressed each option. The 
dissent argued for a state law standard and the majority for a fed-
eral law standard. Notably, each opinion used the cases Jared P. v. 
Glade T. and Bruce L. v. W.E., from Arizona and Alaska courts 
respectively, to support its conclusion.70 However, Jared P. and 
Bruce L. actually present a third response to the question of 
Congress’s intent: imperfectly fulfilled state law. These courts 
looked to state law for the requirements to establish paternity but 
did not require Indian fathers to comply perfectly to qualify as a 
parent under ICWA. Courts that use the imperfectly fulfilled state 
law standard attempt to combine the best rationales from state law 
and federal law standards. 
 
 69. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
 70. Jared P. v. Glade T., 209 P.3d 157 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009); Bruce L. v. W.E., 247 P.3d 
966 (Alaska 2011). 
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A. State Law Standard 
State law is the most common standard courts use to determine 
if a father acknowledged or established paternity under ICWA. 
State courts of last resort in Oklahoma71 and New Jersey72 each 
applied state law, with appellate courts in California73 and Texas74 
doing so as well. Each state could have a different standard for 
acknowledging and establishing paternity if its statutes uphold 
minimum constitutional protections.75 Additionally, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that state law approaches must 
be “permissible variations on the methods of acknowledging and 
establishing paternity within the general contemplation of Con-
gress when it passed ICWA.”76 
While there are various state standards, there are also general 
trends. State legislatures have broadly produced three types of laws 
addressing paternity. First, circumstances are listed in which a man 
is presumed to be the child’s father.77 One of those circumstances is 
 
 71. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Okla. 1985) (holding acknowl-
edgement and establishment is accomplished through “procedures available through the 
tribal courts, consistent with tribal customs, or through procedures established by state 
law”), overruled by In re Baby Boy L., 103 P.3d 1099 (Okla. 2004) (overruling In re Adoption of 
Baby Boy D. for using the “existing Indian family” doctrine but not in the application of 
state law). 
 72. In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 935 (N.J. 1988) (“[W]e 
infer a legislative intent to have the acknowledgment or establishment of paternity deter-
mined by state law.”). 
 73. In re Daniel M., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 897, 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (“Moreover, because 
the ICWA does not provide a standard for the acknowledgment or establishment of 
paternity, courts have resolved the issue under state law.”). 
 74. Yavapai-Apache Tribe v. Mejia, 906 S.W.2d 152, 173 (Tex. App. 1995) (citing In re 
Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 935 (N.J. 1988)). 
 75. “[U]nwed fathers who grasp the opportunity to parent their biological children 
have constitutionally protected interests equal to married parents and unwed mothers. On the 
other hand, unwed fathers who have only a biological link to their children, and nothing 
more, are not constitutionally entitled to the procedural protections given to married fathers 
and mothers.” Brief of Family Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 
Birth Father and Cherokee Nation at 8–9, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013) 
(No. 12-399). See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 
(1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
 76. Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d at 935. 
 77. For example, under the Utah statute, paternity is presumed when the putative 
father is married to the mother when the child is born or if the child was born within 300 
days of the termination of their marriage. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-204 (West 2017). 
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when the father voluntarily acknowledges his paternity.78 The 
second type of law therefore identifies these requirements as 
acknowledgement. Acknowledgement “generally refers to a writing 
by a father (with or without a requirement of consent by the 
mother), where the writing itself has the legal effect of sustaining a 
father’s parental rights to some degree.”79 An example of this 
writing comes from the Uniform Parentage Act, promulgated by 
the Uniform Laws Commissioners in 1975.80 A father acknowledges 
paternity by filing the writing containing attested signatures of the 
mother and father with the state agency maintaining birth 
records.81 An acknowledged father is guaranteed the right to 
“receive notice of court proceedings regarding the child,” the 
opportunity to “seek visitation with the child, and usually will be 
required to provide financial support to the child.”82 The third set 
of laws provides an alternative to acknowledging paternity with 
“the concept of an establishment of paternity, which is initiated by 
a court filing and culminates in the issuance of a judicial order 
(sometimes contested but not necessarily) establishing the father’s 
parental rights and obligations.”83 Another frequent option for 
establishing paternity is genetic testing.84 
In Utah, a father can acknowledge paternity with a declaration 
filed with the Office of Vital Records accompanied by a “written 
and verbal notice of the alternatives to, the legal consequences of, 
and the rights and responsibilities that arise from signing the 
declaration.”85 The declaration of paternity is not valid if it is filed 
or signed after consent or relinquishment to adoption has been 
given.86 Establishing paternity is possible through a judicial or 
 
 78. See, e.g., id. § 78B-15-204(1)(d); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814(A)(4) (2018); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 7-1106(1) (West 2018). 
 79. In re Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 170, 417 P.3d 1, 49–50 (citations omitted). 
 80. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT §§ 302, 304 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 2017). 
 81. Id. 
 82. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, THE RIGHTS OF 
UNMARRIED FATHERS (2014). 
 83. Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 170, 417 P.3d at 49–50 (Lee, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis omitted). 
 84. See UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT art. 5 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 2017). 
 85. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-302(5) (West 2017). 
 86. Id. § 78B-15-302(8). 
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administrative finding.87 The strictness of this timing would have 
caused Birth Father in In re Adoption of B.B. to fail to acknowledge 
paternity under state law. 
The rationale for the application of state law is fourfold. First, 
there is a strong presumption that “[a]ny time Congress acts . . . it 
intends to respect the traditional boundaries between state and 
federal power. That presumption is at its zenith in the area 
of domestic relations given the traditional responsibility of the 
States in such matters.”88 In using family law terms like acknowledge 
and establish it can be assumed that state law definitions would 
apply. This is demonstrated in De Sylva v. Ballentine, in which a 
copyright renewal rights case turned on the definition of children.89 
The court explained, 
The scope of a federal right is, of course, a federal question, but that 
does not mean that its content is not to be determined by state, 
rather than federal law. This is especially true where a statute deals 
with a familial relationship; there is no federal law of domestic 
relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern.90 
The term children “requires reference to the law of the State 
which created those legal relationships.”91 The court did not apply 
state law without any qualifications though. It stated “[t]his does 
not mean that a State would be entitled to use the word ‘children’ 
in a way entirely strange to those familiar with its ordinary usage, 
but at least to the extent that there are permissible variations in the 
ordinary concept of ‘children’ we deem state law controlling.”92 
ICWA cases are squarely those of “domestic relations,” and the acts 
of acknowledging and establishing paternity effectively regulate what 
is a legally recognized familial relationship. 
Justice Thomas Lee in In re Adoption of B.B. goes so far as to claim 
that “the protection of the traditional jurisdiction of state courts 
over adoption proceedings” was a “key countervailing purpose” of 
 
 87. Id. § 78B-15-601(1). 
 88. Brief for Petitioners at 14–15, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013) 
(No. 12-399), 2013 WL 633597. 
 89. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956). 
 90. Id. at 580 (citation omitted). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 581. 
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ICWA.93 Though there is no direct expression of this purpose in the 
text it could be inferred by comparing what the statute does and does 
not do: “ICWA does not create an independent federal adoption 
regime.”94 Other evidence of this preservation of states’ roles is in 
the committee report: “the Committee does not feel that it is neces-
sary or desirable to oust the states of their traditional jurisdiction 
over Indian children falling within their geographic limits.”95 
 Second, the question about the standard for establishing 
paternity raises issues of separation of powers. Congress is the 
policymaker and courts interpret the law. To have state courts 
determining what actions are sufficient to acknowledge and 
establish paternity gives them too great a policymaking power.96 As 
evident from ICWA and other family law cases, paternity questions 
involve a careful balancing of state, parent, child, and societal 
interests, and a legislature has the best tools to research the optimal 
standard. Justice Lee emphasizes that this mingling of powers is 
particularly unlikely because the federal Congress would not 
delegate its policymaking power to a “judicial branch of another 
sovereign—fifty sovereigns, really—in a field traditionally left to 
that sovereign’s sole authority.”97 
Third, Congress did not intend acknowledge and establish to be 
applied uniformly. Holyfield recognized that state-law definitions of 
statutory terms can be applied when “uniformity clearly was not 
intended.”98 One such example is the statute at issue in the 
copyright case, De Sylva, which explicitly draws upon family law 
terms.99 Another is the statute at issue in Reconstruction Financial 
Corp. v. Beaver County, a case in which Congress allowed “real 
property” of an agency to “be subject to State, Territorial, county, 
municipal, or local taxation.”100 The Supreme Court determined 
that the state law definition of “real property” should apply, not the 
 
 93. In re Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 159, 417 P.3d 1, 47 (Lee, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. ¶ 160, 417 P.3d at 48. 
 95. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 19 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7541. 
 96. Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 174, 417 P.3d at 51 (Lee, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 44 (1989). 
 99. See supra text accompanying notes 89–92. 
 100. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 206 (1946) (cita-
tions omitted). 
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federal definition. This is because of the congressional purpose and 
state traditions: 
Concepts of real property are deeply rooted in state traditions, 
customs, habits, and laws . . . . To permit the States to tax, and yet 
to require them to alter their long-standing practice of 
assessments and collections, would create the kind of confusion 
and resultant hampering of local tax machinery which we are 
certain Congress did not intend.101 
By using state law paternity terms that are “deeply rooted in 
state traditions, customs, habits and laws,” Congress demonstrated 
it intended no uniformity in the definitions of acknowledge and 
establish. Furthermore, to require the state to apply two different 
standards for establishing paternity, one for the parents of non-
Indian children and one for the parents of Indian children, may 
“create[] confusion and result[] [in the] hampering of local” family 
law adjudications. 
Fourth, even if uniformity is the congressional goal, a federal 
reasonableness standard will not create uniformity across the vari-
ous state courts. State law, at least, provides uniformity within the 
state. The processes for acknowledging and establishing paternity 
are recorded in statutes and upheld consistently across cases. In 
contrast, reasonableness standards invite subjective interpretations 
and particularly fact-specific analyses. Though it is extreme to 
suggest that such a standard will “guarantee chaos and unpredict-
ability,” it will likely create wide variation of what is reasonable 
within and across jurisdictions.102 Having internal consistency 
within each state is better for an Indian father. He has notice 
through the statute of what is required for him to claim his rights. 
He needs to do no case law research to determine if his actions are 
reasonable. Additionally, state paternity statutes generally describe 
the same basic processes. Acknowledging is a written statement by 
the father submitted to a specified government office, and estab-
lishing is a judicial order. Variations from state to state are real, but 
the actual differences are small. Thus, fathers can anticipate what 
will be required of them in each state. 
 
 101. Id. at 210. 
 102. Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 200, 417 P.3d at 56 (Lee, J., dissenting). 
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B. Federal Law Standard 
The federal standard is most clearly articulated and was for-
mally adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in In re Adoption of B.B. 
Neither ICWA nor other federal laws define precise procedures and 
timing for acknowledging and establishing paternity, so the majority 
created a uniform reasonableness standard for the terms.103 The 
Utah Supreme Court uses case-specific examples of what is 
reasonable but does little else to suggest what may qualify. 
Furthermore, the court does not indicate if Birth Father’s actions 
were sufficient because of their cumulative effect or if any were 
independently adequate. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Constandinos Himonas gave 
weight to Birth Father’s following actions: (1) residing with the 
birth mother before conception, (2) living with the birth mother for 
six months after conception, (3) payment of the birth mother’s bills, 
(4) conveying expectations that they would live together again even 
after their contact ended, (5) hastily informing the tribe of the fraud, 
(6) obtaining legal counsel, and (7) filing many documents asserting 
paternity and intervention in the case.104 Under the plain meaning 
of the terms acknowledge and establish, Birth Father had shown 
“recognition” of the child and “attempts to be responsible” for the 
child.105 Justice Himonas also emphasized that Birth Father had 
“accomplished all of the tasks required by Utah’s [paternity] 
statute” if it were not for the timing issues.106 This suggests that 
state law requirements hold weight under a reasonableness 
standard not simply because they are state law but because they are 
concrete examples of effort to recognize and take responsibility for 
the child.107 
Although the Utah Supreme Court majority was the first to 
articulate its reasoning for looking to federal law rather than state 
law as the uniform federal reasonableness standard, the South 
Carolina Supreme Court has also looked to the plain meaning of 
ICWA terms to guide paternity decisions. Its analysis is even more 
 
 103. Id.¶ 71, 417 P.3d at 24–26 (majority opinion). 
 104. Id. ¶ 74, 417 P.3d at 27. 
 105. Id. ¶ 52, 417 P.3d at 19 (citations omitted). 
 106. Id. ¶ 74, 417 P.3d at 27 (citations omitted) (alteration in original). 
 107. Additionally, state law requirements are relevant because they would clarify 
parental rights for non-ICWA contexts that would be solely governed by state law. 
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sparse and indeterminate than the Utah Supreme Court’s, but it is 
still instructive. The South Carolina court determined that ICWA’s 
“plain terms” allowed a father to “acknowledge[] his paternity 
through the pursuit of court proceedings as soon as he realized [his 
child] had been placed up for adoption and establish[] his paternity 
through DNA testing” even though these actions were not con-
ducted in the time and manner required by state law.108 Here again 
state law and court proceedings provide specific instances for the 
father to show his responsibility for the child. 
In contrast, merely requesting counsel and writing to the court 
in objection to the child’s adoption may be insufficient to acknowl-
edge paternity.109 Speculation may not be enough either.110 
Thus, if other courts apply the federal reasonableness standard, 
they would most likely consider the broad categories of (1) inter-
actions with birth mother, (2) objective evidence of plans for future 
interactions with the child, (3) the filing of traditional state 
paternity paperwork, and (4) voluntary courtroom actions. These 
would probably operate as a factor test, with the filing of traditional 
state paperwork as the factor with the greatest weight. Meeting 
state law requirements might always be sufficient, but unnecessary 
because of all the other reasonable ways that fathers might choose 
to recognize their children and show responsibility for them. A 
father’s recognition, acceptance, and interest in developing a 
relationship with his child outside state legal mechanisms has 
significant weight in real relationships, and this standard allows his 
efforts to count in the courtroom too.111 
 
 108. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 560 (S.C. 2012), rev’d, 570 U.S. 
637 (2013). 
 109. In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 313–14 (Ind. 1988). 
 110. In re Appeal in Maricopa Cty. Juvenile Action No. A-25525, 667 P.2d 228, 233 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1983). 
 111. Justice Himonas’s hypothetical demonstrates this: 
The [state law] standard would lead to absurd situations where an unwed father 
who clearly has acknowledged or established paternity under ICWA would not 
qualify under Utah law. Take, for example, a situation where a biological mother 
abandons a child with the unmarried biological father. If the father acted as the 
sole caretaker for his child, that would surely be a clear-cut case of 
acknowledgement of paternity. But under Utah law, the father would not have 
acknowledged paternity if he did not have a written agreement that the mother 
had also signed. This would provide the father with fewer rights than a 
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There are five reasons showing that Congress intended a 
federal standard to apply to the terms establish and acknowledge. 
First, there is a “general assumption that ‘in the absence of a plain 
indication to the contrary, . . . Congress when it enacts a statute is 
not making the application of the federal act dependent on state 
law.’”112 In addition to case law describing this assumption,113 the 
federalism division in the American legal system supports the 
concept: the federal government should not have to rely on states 
to carry out its enumerated powers. The presumption is stronger 
when the word in question is a “critical term.”114 As domicile is 
critical in Holyfield because it is related to ICWA’s “key juris-
dictional provision,”115 so too acknowledge and establish are critical 
because they relate to key stakeholders. ICWA balances the 
interests of four parties: child, biological parents, adoptive parents, 
and tribe. In some instances, the terms are especially critical 
because the rights of the tribe are connected to the recognition of an 
Indian father as a parent.116 
Second, ICWA was designed to combat the abuses arising from 
state law; to then rely upon state law to determine the rights of key 
stakeholders is illogical. Courts express distrust of state authorities, 
 
reasonability standard under ICWA. We believe a common-sense reading of 
ICWA prohibits [this] strict interpretation. 
Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 73, 417 P.3d at 26–27 (alterations in original) (cita-
tions omitted). 
 112. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989) (quoting 
Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., 460 U.S. 103, 119 (1983); NLRB v. Nat. Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 
600, 603 (1971); Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943)). 
 113. See, e.g., Dickerson, 460 U.S. at 119; Nat. Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S. at 603; Jerome, 318 
U.S. at 104. 
 114. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 44. 
 115. Id. at 45. 
 116. Brief for the Inter Tribal Council of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents Birth Father and Cherokee Nation at 20, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 
637 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1308813 (“[If] an unwed father who has not technically 
preserved his parental rights pursuant to state law would not qualify as a ‘parent’ under 
ICWA, an otherwise involuntary proceeding under 25 U.S.C. § 1912 would be transformed 
into a voluntary proceeding under 25 U.S.C. § 1913 merely by virtue of the mother’s 
voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights to the Indian child. In such circumstances, 
ICWA’s requirements for involuntary proceedings, including notice to the child’s tribe, 
would arguably not apply. This result—the termination of parental rights to an Indian child 
without notice to the child’s tribe, and over the objection of the child’s biological Indian 
parent—is clearly not what Congress intended in crafting ICWA’s provisions.” (cita-
tion omitted)). 
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including state courts, in providing for “the rights of Indian 
families and Indian communities” when they cite the legislative 
history and purpose of the statute.117 Justice Himonas in In re 
Adoption of B.B. captured this rationale vividly: “We are loath to pour 
state law back into ICWA when ICWA’s whole reason for being is to 
drain, what in Congress’s view, is an inequitable swamp—
displacing state law on the matters on which ICWA speaks.”118 
The existence of cases like Holyfield in 1987 show that even after 
the passage of ICWA in 1978 state courts used state law to 
undermine the rights of Indian tribes and parents. The Mississippi 
Supreme Court held, apart from its analysis of domicile, that the 
Holyfield adoption proceedings entirely “escape applicable federal 
law on Indian Child Welfare.”119 This reasoning unashamedly 
ignored the other statutory grounds upon which tribal courts could 
intervene. Furthermore, by taking elaborate efforts to distinguish 
the domicile of the twins from state precedent, the state court 
majority revealed intentions to treat Indian families differently. The 
state court’s willingness to contradict “generally accepted doctrine 
[of] this country”120 to avoid applying ICWA demonstrates the 
validity of Congress’s concern that state courts abuse Indian tribes 
and families.121 
Third, a federal standard fosters uniformity, while a patchwork 
of state laws would not. Federal statutes are generally intended to 
 
 117. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 44–45. 
 118. In re Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 65, 417 P.3d 1, 23. 
 119. In re B.B., 511 So. 2d 918, 921 (Miss. 1987), rev’d sub nom. Miss. Band of Choctaw 
Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
 120. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49. 
 121. Another example of the state courts taking efforts to avoid applying ICWA is the 
existing Indian family exception. State courts imposed an extra-textual requirement 
that exempts “application of the ICWA” in those cases where the Indian child’s 
family has not “maintained a significant social, cultural, or political relationship 
with [their] tribe.” . . . Where there is no Indian family to break up, either because 
it never existed or had already broken apart prior to the custody proceedings, 
courts reason that ICWA does not apply. 
Shawn L. Murphy, The Supreme Court’s Revitalization of the Dying “Existing Indian Family” 
Exception, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 629, 636 (quoting Barbara Atwood, Flashpoints Under the 
Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 
587, 625 (2002)). Twelve states applied the exception, but now only six do (Alabama, Indiana, 
Missouri, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Tennessee). Id. A version of this doctrine was upheld by 
the Supreme Court in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013). 
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have national applicability.122 On the other hand, when courts find 
that Congress intended a state-law definition of a term, the statutes 
are often those where uniformity was clearly not intended.123 
Congress found the violation of Indian rights across the United 
States, and so the presumption for a nationally applicable solution 
is not rebutted. The essential element of the solution is knowing 
when to apply the heightened protections. If a father of an Indian 
child is entitled to heightened protection of his rights in Minnesota, 
why should he not have the same protections in Montana? The 
Holyfield court found that “a statute under which different rules 
apply from time to time to the same child, simply as a result of his 
or her transport from one State to another, cannot be what Congress 
had in mind.”124 
Furthermore, there is a presumption of uniformity when the 
application of state law would impair the federal program.125 One 
example of the frustration of the federal program through the 
application of state law is given in In re Adoption of B.B. Utah does 
not allow a father to acknowledge paternity unless the mother gives 
her signature. “Thus, in cases where the birth mother declines to 
sign the declaration, the unmarried biological father is precluded 
from acknowledging paternity under ICWA . . . .”126 He must 
establish paternity, instead, under Utah’s notoriously strict laws. 
Requiring him to meet this very high standard to receive “any 
protection of his parental rights . . . ‘would to a large extent nullify 
the purpose the ICWA was intended to accomplish.’”127 
Fourth, “Congress can and does expressly state when it wants 
a state or tribal law definition to apply.”128 The definitions of 
 
 122. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 43. 
 123. Id. at 44. 
 124. Id. at 46. See also Brief for Respondent Birth Father at 25–26, Adoptive Couple v. 
Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1191183. (“At the time that Congress 
enacted ICWA, state adoption-consent laws varied dramatically. Some States required the 
unwed father’s consent only if he had established paternity according to the jurisdiction’s 
own laws; others if he had established paternity under the laws of any jurisdiction; and still 
others required him both to acknowledge paternity and to legitimate the child. Others did 
not require his consent under any circumstances at all.” (citations omitted)). 
 125. Id. at 44. 
 126. In re Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 67, 417 P.3d 1, 24. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. ¶ 60, 417 P.3d at 21 (citations omitted). 
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extended family member129 and Indian custodian130 expressly refer to 
state law or tribal law. The lack of such specificity in the definition 
of parent indicates that Congress “rejected the formulation 
embodied in the neighboring provision.”131 This canon of interpre-
tation harmonizes well with the presumptions that federal law will 
not depend upon state law and that uniformity is intended. If these 
presumptions are not reflective of Congress’s intention, then it has 
the tools (which it has used) to apply state law. 132 
Finally, the federal standard should be one of reasonableness 
because of  
the canon of interpretation that [states] where a statute is silent as 
to the time or manner of a subject, [courts] presume a 
reasonability standard—an approach that is consistent with 
ICWA case law and has been applied by many states over many 
years and many different topics of law.133  
C. Imperfectly Fulfilled State Law Standard 
The third standard, imperfectly fulfilled state law, is described 
in Arizona and Alaska court cases. The Alaska case was cited by 
Justice Himonas to provide precedent for imposing a federal 
reasonableness standard in In re Adoption of B.B.134 The dissent 
correctly counters that neither the Arizona nor Alaska case 
explicitly establishes this federal standard;135 rather, the courts 
write of state requirements imperfectly fulfilled. These cases 
support the opposing two standards and yet provide no definitive 
precedent, because each case hybridizes the reasonableness and 
state law approaches. 
The Arizona Court of Appeals created the imperfectly fulfilled 
state law standard in Jared P. v. Glade T. The birth father successfully 
 
 129. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2) (2012). 
 130. Id. § 1903(6). 
 131. Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 60, 417 P.3d at 21 (quoting Craig v. Provo City, 2016 
UT 40, ¶ 38 n.9, 389 P.3d 423, 431 n.9). 
 132. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(6). 
 133. Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 71 n.26, 417 P.3d at 25 n.26 (citing cases related to 
contract performance, permitting licenses, winding up corporations, record keeping require-
ments, among others). 
 134. Id. ¶ 72 n.28, 417 P.3d at 26 n.28. 
 135. Id. ¶ 166 n.33, 417 P.3d at 49 n.33 (Lee, J., dissenting). 
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acknowledged paternity for the purposes of ICWA by (1) chal-
lenging the adoption agency’s petition seeking to terminate his 
parental rights, (2) attempting to be present for the child’s birth, 
(3) filing a paternity action in another state, (4) amending his out-
of-state action upon learning the adoptive parents’ intentions to 
adopt, (5) writing letters to the juvenile court explaining he was the 
father, (6) enrolling in the tribe and submitting a copy of his 
membership to the court, and (7) complying with a court order for 
a DNA test that identified him as the child’s biological father.136 He 
“failed to comply formally” with the Arizona statutory require-
ments because he did not notify the mother that he had initiated a 
paternity action within thirty days after receiving notice of the 
adoption, but the court found that he still acknowledged paternity 
under ICWA.137 
Citing Jared P., the Alaska Supreme Court in Bruce L. v. W.E. 
found that for purposes of ICWA “an unwed father does not need 
to comply perfectly with state laws for establishing paternity, so 
long as he has made reasonable efforts to acknowledge 
paternity.”138 In this case the father failed to legitimate his son 
within the year required by state law because birth mother did not 
sign the forms; however, his filing of an “acknowledgement of 
paternity and an affidavit of paternity with the superior court[,]” 
“mov[ing] for custody and later . . . paternity testing[,]” and 
“fil[ing] a separate suit for custody” of the child were sufficient for 
ICWA parental recognition.139 The Alaska Supreme Court applied 
a reasonableness standard, but the standard is not explicitly or 
implicitly federal. However, I interpret it as implementing the 
imperfectly fulfilled state law standard because its analysis is 
firmly anchored in Alaska state statutes and court procedures. 
These courts are silent as to how much flexibility a putative 
father is accorded in meeting state requirements to satisfy ICWA. 
Because each father’s failure to meet state requirements was related 
to timing issues, it is unlikely that courts would hold it reasonable 
to omit substantive actions. For example, failure to file all state 
forms or failure to make court motions are probably fatal lapses in 
 
 136. Jared P. v. Glade T., 209 P.3d 157, 162 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). 
 137. Id. at 162–63; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106 (2017). 
 138. Bruce L. v. W.E., 247 P.3d 966, 979 (Alaska 2011). 
 139. Id. (alterations in original). 
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fulfilling state requirements. Similarly, the courts gave no consid-
eration to actions that fathers took outside the legal system. The 
interpersonal interactions and intentions of the fathers were 
apparently not a substitute for attempts to avail themselves of state 
legal remedies to paternity questions for purposes of ICWA. 
Thus, this third standard is a hybrid of the state law and federal 
law standards. State law remains the root of the analysis and its 
requirements are given the most weight. And there is an argument 
that it is reasonable for courts to consider the father’s near-perfect 
efforts to claim his child through the legal system as satisfying the 
plain meaning of acknowledge and establish. This standard allows 
courts to consider the proportionality of the father’s failure to 
comply with the seriousness of its effects upon his and his 
child’s lives. 
Courts, legal professionals, and scholars have scarcely provid-
ed any rationale for the father’s imperfect fulfillment of state law 
because (1) only two states have applied it and (2) these cases are 
incorrectly cited as supporting a federal standard.140 Other than 
purpose-based arguments, the support for imperfectly fulfilled 
state law comes from the BIA Guidelines that suggest a liberal 
interpretation of the law.141 
IV. RECOMMENDATION 
Upon review of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, I conclude that 
the current standard for acknowledge and establish in § 1903(9) must 
be supplied by state law. Nevertheless, policy concerns, the 
purposes of ICWA, and the rationale of Holyfield should prompt 
Congress to amend ICWA to create a federal standard that allows 
for tribal variation in establishing paternity. In section A, I describe 
the reasons for my conclusion that state law currently applies, and 
in section B, I describe three principles that should guide Congress 
as it fixes flaws that remain from the application of the state 
law standard. 
 
 140. See Jared P., 209 P.3d at 157; Bruce L., 247 P.3d at 966; Indian Child Welfare Act 
Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,778, 38,796 (June 14, 2016) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23). 
 141. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 
67,584, 67,586 (Nov. 26, 1979) (ICWA is “to be liberally construed”). 
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A. Under Current Precedent, Courts Must Apply 
the State Law Standard 
Determining which standard’s rationales are stronger was not 
an easy call. Because Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 
is the most apposite and controlling precedent for this ICWA 
definition issue, I determined that the key question is if the 
definitions of acknowledge and establish were analogous to the defi-
nition of domicile.142 If they were sufficiently similar, then federal 
law should apply. If they were distinguishable, then state law 
should apply. They are distinguishable. Unlike federal domicile 
law, there is no federal paternity law that courts can apply in the 
alternative to state law. Without any existing federal law, it would 
be inappropriate for state courts to create federal law to fill the gaps 
in the statute because courts cannot adequately balance state, tribal, 
parental, and child interests. 
Concerns for federalism do not animate this conclusion. 
Congress has plenary power over Indian tribes that extends to 
aspects of life that for non-Indians only state law would apply.143 
Certainly states “have an interest in child custody matters. But 
under the Constitution, [s]tates have no interest in matters affecting 
tribal membership or internal tribal relations.”144 Statutes relating 
to Indian affairs cannot simply be balanced on the traditional scale 
between state and federal interests; a third sovereign changes those 
calculations. In many jurisdictional questions, the states’ authority 
over tribes and Indians is not inherent and comes from congres-
sional actions that abrogate tribal sovereignty and divest tribal 
jurisdiction. Congressional regulation of the way states exercise 
authority over Indians (and their children) is nothing new. If 
Congress chooses to create federal paternity law relating to Indian 
children, it has the power to do so. However, none of ICWA’s 
provisions show that Congress created federal paternity law, and 
without existing federal paternity law to draw upon, courts must 
apply state law. 
 
 142. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
 143. Examples include education, health care, alcohol regulation, property taxes, 
tobacco sales, and criminal codes. 
 144. Brief for the Cherokee Nation at 53, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 
(2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1225770. 
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The key to my conclusion is that the question of establishing 
paternity is distinguishable from the question in Holyfield. The 
application of federal law to an undefined term in Holyfield was 
dependent upon the existence of federal law to substitute for 
statutory silence. Domicile, acknowledge, and establish are each 
critical terms of ICWA because of their determinative influence on 
jurisdiction and the protections applicable to the case. However, 
domicile is “a concept widely used in . . . federal . . . courts for 
jurisdiction and conflict-of-laws purposes.”145 The presence of domi-
cile in federal law meant that the Supreme Court could interpret law 
rather than create it. And while the Court gave itself the option to 
“draw[] on general state-law principles” to make its determination, 
this really is no different than the traditional judicial process of 
looking to persuasive authority.146 Furthermore, the Court had the 
federal case Yarborough v. Yarborough regarding the domicile of 
minors to guide its analysis.147 Acknowledge and establish have no 
equivalent presence in federal case law. 
The judiciary is not the body that should fill the gap and create 
federal paternity law. The lawmaker must deliberate with excep-
tional care to define the critical, legal relationships between family 
members. Even with attentive research and analysis, state legis-
latures have developed multiple valid approaches to paternity law. 
A court is not in the position to weigh the various merits of each 
paternity statute and pick the one that best represents the needs of 
its constituents. That responsibility is constitutionally mandated 
and most practically assigned to the legislature.148 It is illogical to 
presume that Congress would use two words in a definition section 
to delegate to state courts the power to determine federal paternity 
law, especially when there was no existing federal law to 
guide them.149 
 
 145. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 48. 
 146. Id. at 47. 
 147. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 211 (1933). 
 148. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 149. This is not to say that the U.S. Supreme Court cannot address paternity questions. 
It heard cases about due process of, and equal protection for, unwed fathers under state law 
throughout the 1970s. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 
246 (1978); Caban v. Mohammad, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
The Court must make constitutional determinations, but its role is not to create the law. 
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As with all tricky statutory interpretation cases, the answer is 
ultimately a battle of presumptions. The presumption from De Sylva 
is strongest: when Congress writes laws dependent upon familial 
relationships it “requires a reference to the law of the State which 
created those legal relationships.”150 Acknowledge and establish are 
legal terms of art in a state-dominated area of law that do not 
require even more specific invocations of state law.151 
Additionally, the presumption that Congress would not use 
state law because states were the culprit behind Indian child 
removal can be rebutted because laws of paternity are objective and 
of general applicability. Unlike questions that require courts to 
define adequate parenting, which state courts were manipulating 
and which was the initial target of ICWA,152 acknowledging and 
establishing paternity are generally dependent upon paperwork 
and genetic testing. This limits the opportunities for state court 
abuse. If these requirements were to become onerous or unjust, 
they would have a greater likelihood of being democratically 
overturned because all residents, not just Indians, are affected 
by them.153 
 The foregoing analysis presents the question as a decision 
between applying state or federal law because that is where the 
debate in the Supreme Court has centered. Nevertheless, courts 
could apply the imperfectly fulfilled state law standard. This fails 
not only because I have shown that state law applies, but also this 
standard eliminates the benefits of the federal and state law 
standards rather than multiplying them. By starting with state law 
and then allowing untold variation in its application, Alaska and 
Arizona courts effectively create no standard. An unworkable 
 
 150. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580–82 (1956). 
 151. See In re Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 188, 417 P.3d 1, 54 (Lee, J., dissenting); 
Brief of Amici Curiae National Council for Adoption in Support of Petitioners at 7, Adoptive 
Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 749938 (“Thus, an ‘acknowl-
edgment of paternity’ remains a term of art in the context of establishing paternity.”). 
 152. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2012) (“[T]he States, exercising their recognized jurisdic-
tion over Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies, have 
often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and 
social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.”). 
 153. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Caban, 441 U.S. at 380; 
Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 246; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645. 
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standard, even in the guise of adhering to ICWA’s purpose, is 
detrimental to Indian parents. 
This standard still relies upon state law for its analysis, and thus 
pours state law back into ICWA where Congress may have 
intended to drain it.154 States still have wide variability in the 
requirements for acknowledging and establishing paternity, and so 
there would be no uniformity from state to state. Even within 
jurisdictions, the reasonableness analysis creates a focus on specific 
facts could lead to huge variations in outcomes. This is especially 
likely because Jared P.155 and Bruce L.156 provide no guidance as to 
which facets of the law require perfect or just reasonable 
compliance. This adds an unnecessary complication for judges. 
And although courts successfully apply the reasonableness stan-
dard in many contexts, those contexts are generally vaguer than the 
specific state paternity statutes.157 
The dissent in In re Adoption of B.B. highlights one problem of 
having a standard that is too informal for establishing paternity 
because of its implications for notice. 
A family who wishes to adopt a child of Indian heritage has a 
statutory duty to provide notice to any parent. But if parent 
includes anyone who has vaguely acknowledged paternity in some 
informal ways, the adopting family will have no way to know 
how to fulfill its obligations under ICWA. And an Indian mother 
would have no way of assuring that her child will actually be 
given to the adoptive couple, even after her own parental rights 
have been terminated. . . . Surely Congress didn’t mean to require 
biological mothers and adoptive families to give notice to persons 
whose acknowledgment of paternity was so vague and informal 
that they cannot reasonably be identified.158 
Therefore, this imperfectly fulfilled state law standard also 
abandons the benefits of applying state law: notice, predictability, 
and stability. 
 
 154. Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 65, 417 P.3d at 23 (majority opinion). 
 155. Jared P. v. Glade T., 209 P.3d 157 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). 
 156. Bruce L. v. W.E., 247 P.3d 966 (Alaska 2011). 
 157. Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 71 nn.26–27, 417 P.3d at 25–26 nn.26–27. 
 158. Id. ¶ 172, 417 P.3d at 51 (Lee, J., dissenting). 
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Such uncertainty as to which elements of the law are flexible 
may also raise important questions of fairness and due process. If a 
state’s requirements for acknowledging and establishing paternity 
are constitutional, then it appears unjust for some fathers to be 
required to perfectly comply while others are not. This is especially 
true when the stakes are so high—the fundamental relationships of 
parent to child and child to tribe. ICWA as a whole and in part has 
sparked arguments of unconstitutionality, some of which allege 
that Indians’ unique treatment by Congress is impermissibly 
rooted in racial preference rather than political status.159 Applying 
this standard could raise more of these questions because it appears 
to grant paternalistic leniency to Indian fathers rather than help 
fulfill the purposes of ICWA. 
B. Principles to Guide the Amendment 
Though Supreme Court precedent and legal presumptions 
show that courts should currently apply state law to define acknowl-
edge and establish, doing so is problematic for three reasons: (1) state 
courts have historically abused their power to disproportionately 
remove Indian children, (2) state law fails “to recognize the essen-
tial tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social 
standards prevailing in Indian communities and families[,]”160 and 
(3) an unwed father’s protections under ICWA could vary from 
state to state. An amendment that creates federal paternity law for 
ICWA contexts could rectify these issues. This amendment should 
provide an Indian father with a choice to acknowledge and 
establish his paternity by either fulfilling the enumerations of a 
federal statute or invoking tribal law and custom.  
 
 159. See Brief for Petitioners at 17–18, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013) 
(No. 12-399), 2013 WL 633597; Brief of Amici Curiae National Council for Adoption in Support 
of Petitioners at 9–10, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 
WL 749938. See generally Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 
535 (1974). 
 160. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2012). 
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1. Prevent state court abuse 
As I’ve explained, 161 the risk for state court abuse of state pater-
nity schemes is less than it is with other aspects of child welfare 
law162 because the paternity statutes are generally specific and 
objective. In the new federal paternity scheme, Congress should 
follow that same pattern to combat any lingering opportunities for 
state courts and institutions to abuse their power.  
The Uniform Parentage Act is a good model163 because it 
carefully enumerates the presumption of parentage,164 voluntary 
acknowledgement of paternity,165 accommodations for genetic 
testing,166 and alternative methods of establishing paternity.167 This 
is not to say that parties will not find a way to litigate and dispute 
issues of signatures, the efficacy of genetic tests, or the timing of 
these elements. But having a clear statement of the law through 
statute is preferable to a reasonableness standard because there is 
less room for the fact finder to introduce subjectivity that harms the 
rights of Indian fathers and tribes. A middle-class white father’s 
genetic test is just as suspect as that of an Indian father. 
 
 161. See supra Sections III.A, IV.A. 
 162. Statutes that speak in generalities rather than giving concrete actions and dead-
lines create opportunities for state courts to establish precedent that disadvantages Indian 
parents. Examples of this within ICWA include the debate over “good cause,” 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(a)–(b), and “active efforts,” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). See also Megan Scanlon, From Theory 
to Practice: Incorporating the “Active Efforts” Requirement in Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 
43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 629 (2011); Denise L. Stiffarm, The Indian Child Welfare Act: Guiding the 
Determination of Good Cause to Depart from the Statutory Placement Preferences, 70 WASH. L. REV. 
1151 (1995). 
 163. The Uniform Parentage Act focuses on the equality of parental rights. That 
emphasis has led the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to 
update the Act in 2017 to reflect modern parents, considering Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584 (2015), which declared same-sex marriage a constitutional right, and including 
surrogacy arrangements. While questions related to these types of paternity have not been 
highly litigated within ICWA contexts, they are likely to be increasingly common. By 
adopting some of these provisions, Congress could address the issues more efficiently than 
leaving their resolution to courts. 
 164. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT art. II (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 2017). 
 165. Id. art. III. 
 166. Id. art. V. 
 167. Id. art. VI. 
 
007.SMITH_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/6/19  2:38 PM 
1451 Establishing Paternity Under ICWA 
 1483 
2. Account for tribal custom 
State law and courts’ current application of federal law do not 
adequately account for tribal paternity law and customs. Justice 
Himonas in In re Adoption of B.B. writes that it would be “unfair and 
an unwarranted intrusion by states into Indian customs and 
practices” to apply state law.168 But his implementation of a 
uniform federal reasonableness standard contains no room for 
variability per different tribal customs or codes. In fact, he explicitly 
rejects such.169 This view is ultimately incompatible with the pur-
pose of ICWA because accounting for tribal law and customs is the 
best way to respect and protect Indian children, families, and tribes.  
The use of tribal law to determine paternity is not a new idea.170 
The New Jersey Supreme Court once concluded that 
Congress intended to defer to state or tribal law standards . . . so 
long as these approaches are permissible variations . . . within the 
general contemplation of Congress when it passed the ICWA, and 
provide a realistic opportunity for an unwed father to establish an 
actual or legal relationship with his child.171 
The Navajo Nation also advocates for the use of tribal law, 
though it argues from the position that state law is the greatest 
threat to tribal interests, not an acceptable alternative like the New 
 
 168. In re Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 69, 417 P.3d 1, 24. 
 169. Id. ¶ 70, 417 P.3d at 24 (“As with state law, the application of tribal law to the 
definition of a parent under ICWA would result in a lack of nationwide uniformity. Based 
on Holyfield, we determine that Congress could hardly have intended that result.”). 
 170. See Kevin Heiner, Are You My Father? Adopting a Federal Standard for Acknowledging 
or Establishing Paternity in State Court ICWA Proceedings, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2151, 2168–69 
nn.144–45 (2017) (citing comments by the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians, Saint 
Regis Mohawk Tribe, and Tulalip Tribes for the 2015 guidelines that recommend the use of 
tribal law in the definition of “parent”); Comment Letter from Agua Caliente Band of 
Cahuilla Indians to Elizabeth Appel, BIA (May 19, 2015), http://www.regulations.gov 
/document?D=BIA-2015-0001-1181 (“Re: Proposed ICWA Regulations”); Comment Letter 
from Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe to Elizabeth Appel, BIA (May 19, 2015), http://www. 
regulations.gov/document?D=BIA-2015-0001-1329 (“Re: . . . Regulations for State Courts 
and Agencies in Indian Child Custody Proceedings”); Comment Letter from Tulalip Tribes 
to Elizabeth Appel, BIA (May 19, 2015), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D=BIA 
-2015-0001-0656 (“Re: . . . Regulations for State Courts and Agencies in Indian Child 
Custody Proceedings”). 
 171. In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 935 (N.J. 1988) (cita-
tions omitted). 
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Jersey Supreme Court found.172 The tribe explains that using tribal 
law harmonizes with Congress’s “underlying intent to infuse tribal 
law and customs particular to family relations . . . into child welfare 
matters involving Indian children.”173 Family relations are integral 
to determining tribal membership, an area of law squarely within 
tribal sovereignty.174 “Tribes’ sovereign powers to regulate mem-
bership would be frustrated if state law governed ‘paternity.’”175 
Despite the discussion of applying tribal law, it is regrettable that 
state courts have not seriously considered the option enough to 
implement it.176 
Congress’s recognition of the importance of incorporating tribal 
law is evident in other provisions of ICWA. For example, extended 
family member and Indian custodian are defined in terms of tribal 
custom.177 Even more importantly, the role of the tribal court 
throughout ICWA demonstrates Congress’s trust in tribes. Tribal 
courts have the opportunity to “establish a different order of 
preference”178 in the placement of children, and the standards used 
in these decisions are the “prevailing social and cultural standards 
of the Indian community in which the parent or extended family 
resides or . . . [maintains] social and cultural ties.”179 Tribes are 
 
 172. Brief for the Navajo Nation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 10–11, 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1399374 (“States 
could create laws in contravention of 25 U.S.C.A. § 1921 . . . to eliminate parental rights 
altogether under ICWA.”). 
 173. Id. at 9. 
 174. See id. at 10. 
 175. Id. 
 176. It is understandable that the courts would lack this imagination, given the U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent focusing on the interpretation of family law terms and Holyfield’s 
emphasis on federal law uniformity. Nevertheless, tribal law is a logical choice for many 
reasons. First, ICWA shows a strong preference for tribal courts with jurisdictional pro-
visions. 25 § U.S.C. § 1911 (2012). These courts have expertise and the right to apply tribal 
law rather than state law in many matters. Child welfare proceedings should not be the 
exception when tribal courts must apply state law. And when the state is exercising its 
concurrent jurisdiction over a child domiciled off the reservation, it is just as foreign to the 
court to apply federal law as it would be to apply tribal law. Second, some tribal courts have 
extensive experience applying ICWA. See, e.g., Indian Child Welfare, PONCA TRIBE INDIANS 
OKLA., http://ponca.com/indian-child-welfare.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2019); Cherokee 
Nation Indian Child Welfare, CHEROKEE NATION, http://www.cherokee.org/Services/Indian 
-Child-Welfare (last visited Jan. 14, 2019). 
 177. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2), (6). 
 178. Id. § 1915(c). 
 179. Id. § 1915(d). 
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given, at a minimum, concurrent jurisdiction over child welfare 
proceedings; their judgments are entitled to full faith and credit.180 
Congress not only considered but also prioritized the use of tribal 
law and custom; there is no reason that the determination of 
paternity should be any different.181 
It is impractical to defer entirely to tribal law for the definitions 
of acknowledge and establish for the simple reason that not all 567 
federally recognized tribes have laws addressing paternity. Tribes 
that have well-developed legal systems like the Navajo Nation,182 
St. Regis Mohawk,183 Snoqualmie,184 Northern Arapaho,185 or Spirit 
Lake Nation186 have codes that are on point. Other federally 
recognized tribes like the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians,187 
Cheyenne-Arapaho of Oklahoma,188 or Shingle Springs Band of 
Miwok Indians189 may not have tribal codes or their codes do not 
address the topic. If ICWA refers solely to tribal law as the standard 
for acknowledge and establish, Congress would create even more 
gaps; courts would have to decide yet again whether to apply state 
or federal law in the absence of tribal law. 
 
 180. Id. § 1911. 
 181. The Navajo Nation argues that it is “commonsense for ICWA to defer to tribal laws 
on family relations.” The question the tribe raises is a valid one: “Why would ICWA apply 
tribal law or custom to determine who is an ‘extended family member’ but not to determine 
who has acknowledged or established paternity to be a ‘parent’?” Brief for the Navajo Nation 
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 11, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 
(2013) (No. 12-399), 2013 WL 1399374. 
 182. In re Guardianship of T.S.E.J., 10 Am. Tribal Law 57, 2011 WL 3625086 (Nav. Sup. 
Ct. 2011). 
 183. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe Family Support Act, https://www.srmt-nsn.gov/_up 
loads/site_files/FINAL_DRAFT_-_Saint_Regis_Mohawk_Tribe_Family_Support_Act.pdf. 
 184. An Act Relating to Indian Child Welfare, 13 Tribal Council Act § 2, http://www. 
snoqualmietribe.us/sites/default/files/icw_code_2015.pdf. 
 185. Family Support Ordinance, 10 Northern Arapaho Code, http://www.northern 
arapaho.com/test2/sites/default/files/documents/files/NA%20Code%20Title%2010%20
Family%20Support%205-13-08.pdf. 
 186. Spirit Lake Nation Law and Order Code, Children’s Code, Resolution No. A05-03-160, 
http://www.spiritlakenation.com/data/upfiles/media/Title_9_Domestice_Relations.pdf. 
 187. 9 Choctaw Domestic Relations Code, http://www.choctaw.org/government 
/court/pdf/TITLE%2009%20DOMESTIC%20RELATIONS%20(rev%2010-11-2016).pdf. 
 188. CHEYENNE-ARAPAHO TRIBES OF OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS, http:// 
thorpe.ou.edu/constitution/Chyn_aph.html#art1. 
 189. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians Family Code, http://www.shingle 
springsrancheria.com/ssr/wp-content/uploads/documents/codes/Family%20Code.pdf. 
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Nevertheless, when tribes have code and customs for estab-
lishing paternity, courts should consider it. Tribal codes are likely 
to have specific enumerations of steps for establishing paternity 
like state standards or the proposed federal standard.190 Using 
tribal custom could lead to some of the same issues of vagueness or 
subjectivity as a reasonableness standard. However, tribal courts’ 
experience and procedures for incorporating cultural standards 
into their judgements sufficiently mitigate this concern. Courts may 
look to five sources for customary law: the parties to the litigation, 
inherent knowledge of tribal judges, secondary literature about 
tribal customs and tradition, people of the community (often 
elders), and the written work of tribal community members.191 
These same sources are available to provide cultural context for 
establishing paternity. State courts have equal access to evidence of 
tribal custom as tribal courts with the exception of the inherent 
knowledge of the tribal judge. This requires more of a court than 
simply examining the date of a form, but the additional efforts are 
worthwhile because of the importance of maintaining Indian 
families and Indian tribes. 
Moreover, state courts should be willing to apply this process 
because it represents the same fairness paradigm that led to the use 
of the reasonableness and imperfectly fulfilled law standards.192 
Courts permitted to examine tribal custom can uphold the 
protections for a father who represents himself as the parent of his 
child in a way that is recognized by his tribal community even 
though he may not have completed all the requirements of state 
law. This outcome seems more just because it avoids dispropor-
tionate consequences. 
 
 190. See, e.g., Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe Family Support Act § IV, https://www.srmt 
-nsn.gov/_uploads/site_files/FINAL_DRAFT_-_Saint_Regis_Mohawk_Tribe_Family_Sup 
port_Act.pdf; An Act Relating to Indian Child Welfare, 13 Tribal Council Act § 2 (8.1.1), 
http://www.snoqualmietribe.us/sites/default/files/icw_code_2015.pdf. 
 191. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Rethinking Customary Law in Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 13 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 57, 89–91 (2007). 
 192. See In re Adoption of B.B., 2017 UT 59, ¶ 68, 417 P.3d 1, 24 (“Utah’s requirements 
for establishment of paternity by unwed fathers are notoriously strict.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); id. ¶ 72, 417 P.3d at 26 (“This approach is consistent with ICWA’s 
liberal administration.”). 
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3. Accepting and encouraging variation 
The most determinative ICWA case has been Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, and my proposed congressional 
amendment appears to reject its key rationale and benefit: 
uniformity. Recognizing the legitimacy of tribal law and customs is 
a more important goal than uniformity. Because of different tribal 
laws and customs, variation is a desired outcome, even the best 
outcome. The U.S. Supreme Court supplied uniformity as a goal, 
and it consequently must be secondary to Congress’s general policy 
of tribal self-determination and ICWA’s specific methods of 
helping Indian tribes to survive.193 
Expecting and allowing variation is an integral part of the 
congressional goal of tribal self-determination. Announced by 
President Richard M. Nixon in 1970,194 this policy provides the 
opportunity for Indian tribes to “promote their tribal economies, 
build governmental infrastructures, provide law and order, 
manage tribal natural and cultural resources, meet the healthcare 
and educational needs of their members, and perform other gov-
ernmental functions” “like other . . . sovereign governments.”195 
This was a pivot away from the assimilationist, paternalistic, and 
racist policies that the U.S. government previously pursued. ICWA 
is one of many acts196 that recognizes tribes’ freedom and authority 
“to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”197 Liberty 
inevitably leads to uniqueness; such was the result with fifty 
different states and such is the result with 567 federally recognized 
tribes. It is incongruous for Congress to promote self-determination 
with so much legislation, including within some provisions of 
ICWA, only to ignore the opportunity to extend it by accom-
modating tribal paternity law and custom out of concern for 
uniformity. Expressly looking to tribal law to establish paternity is 
 
 193. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (2012). 
 194. Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, The History, Status, and Future of 
Tribal Self-Governance Under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 39 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 17 (2015). 
 195. Id. at 3. 
 196. Id. at 46 (giving other examples of self-determination programs like Tribal Tempo-
rary Assistance for Needy Families, community service block grants, Native employment 
works, Head Start, and grants for battered women’s shelters). 
 197. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). 
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another needed symbol that the U.S. federal government and 
American society respect tribal sovereignty and culture. 
Uniformity is still possible procedurally. All Indian fathers will 
be able to establish paternity by looking to the same ICWA 
amendment which will direct them to either examine enumerated 
statutory steps for acknowledging paternity or look to the customs 
and laws of their own tribes. 
Moreover, variation is not inherently offensive to the principles 
of Holyfield. The Court was not concerned about variation in the 
rights of one Indian father compared to another; its concern was 
that “different rules apply from time to time to the same child, 
simply as a result of his or her transport from one State to 
another. . . .”198 An Indian father’s rights should not be dependent 
upon actors outside himself, such as the mother of his child giving 
birth in another state. Under my proposal, the variation in the 
father’s rights are controlled entirely by the father. He is always a 
member of the same tribe, and so any differences between the tribal 
standard and ICWA statutory requirements for paternity will be 
constant. With the federal statutory options also serving as a valid 
way to establish paternity, all fathers would be guaranteed the 
same process to claim their parental rights. 
C. Responding to Current ICWA Amendment Proposals 
I am not alone in advocating that Congress act to correct ICWA; 
Kevin Heiner also reaches this conclusion in his article, “Are You 
My Father? Adopting a Federal Standard for Acknowledging or 
Establishing Paternity in State Court ICWA Proceedings.”199 The 
goal of uniformity guides his analysis and his proposed statute. 
This is a good objective in light of Holyfield, but it is irredeemably 
shortsighted. Heiner’s amendment would provide specificity, 
certainty, and flexibility for fathers establishing paternity under 
ICWA, but it would not eliminate different outcomes based upon 
location of the father because three of its options for establishing 
paternity under ICWA look to state law procedures.200 Thus ICWA 
 
 198. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 46 (1989). 
 199. Heiner, supra note 170, at 2151. 
 200. Id. at 2182–83. 
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determinations ultimately lie in the hands of state legislatures, with 
all the associated risks, rather than in the care of federal or tribal 
actors. The father’s other two options of using genetic testing or 
representing himself as the father through statements or financial 
support are more demonstrative of a reasonableness standard.201 
Having five options to establish paternity resolves the immediate 
questions of what fathers should do, but these do not represent a 
solution that encourages tribal self-determination, dignity, and 
autonomy—a broader movement of which ICWA was only one 
part. My proposal provides at least as much uniformity as Heiner’s 
amendment because there would also be uniformity of the proce-
dures to guide Indian fathers despite the variation. Heiner’s 
suggestion would allow variation based on location while mine 
allows variation based upon tribal membership. 
While Heiner and I both agree that Congress should act, he 
aptly indicates that the last serious attempt to amend ICWA in 2003 
fell through.202 This does not produce great confidence that Con-
gress will respond quickly. Nevertheless, the increased litigation 
regarding the standards of paternity should be ample motivation 
to act. 
V. CONCLUSION 
By enacting ICWA, Congress was remarkably active in its role 
as the guardian of Indian tribes and families. This legislation was 
especially appropriate because of the extremely troubling nature of 
the problem. Congress’s solution was imperfect, however, because 
of its silence about the definition of two critical words—acknowledge 
and establish—as they relate to paternity. State courts have reacted 
with three standards for establishing paternity. Current case law 
shows that the courts must apply a state law standard. Never-
theless, Congress must speak again to correct the flaws from what 
it left unsaid and to fix the problems that arise with a state law 
standard. An amendment to ICWA that creates federal steps for 
establishing paternity or that allows paternity to be established 
through tribal custom and law is necessary. By amending ICWA, 
Congress will give Indian tribes the space they deserve to vocalize 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 2178. 
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their own answers to critical questions—”Who am I?,” “To whom 
do I belong?,” and “What are my responsibilities to those I love?”—
for their member parents and children. 
 
Carlie Smith* 
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